Hybride oorlogvoering

Libguide

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Deze literatuurlijst biedt U een startpunt bij uw onderzoek naar hybride oorlogvoering en aanverwante onderwerpen (unconventional warfare en irregular warfare). Hij bevat links naar oa. (wetenschappelijke)artikelen, blogs, boeken en rapporten gevonden in door de bibliotheek aangeboden databases, op het internet en in de bibliotheek. Materiaal uit kranten en opinieweekbladen (te raadplegen via de database LexisNexis) is in de lijst niet meegenomen.
Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern Europe? / M. Sešelgytė
European Leadership Network, 2014 (17 oktober)

During the crisis in Crimea, the mass media have learned a new buzzword – hybrid war - to label operations of insignia-less “green men” on Ukrainian soil. But in fact, neither the concept nor the essence of the operations was completely original. Irregular troops were used in military operations by many countries throughout history. At the beginning of the 19th century, guerrilla troops were fighting hand in hand with conventional forces in the Peninsular War. A similar strategy was employed during the Vietnam War. The main aim of this strategy was to exhaust the troops of an adversary. In the academic literature this type of warfare was referred to as a compound war, and later as hybrid warfare.

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-become-the-main-security-challenge-for-eastern-europe_2025.html

From Droid Armies to Luke Skywalker: What Star Wars Teaches Us About Hybrid Warfare / J. Baumann
Small Wars Journal, 2015 (16 oktober)

This paper will show, through the medium of Star Wars, that "hybrid threats" are just recent, dramatic developments in technology that allow multiple state and non-state actors on the battlefield to network more efficiently and combine their military efforts for greater effect, resulting in military strategists to incorrectly identify them as previously unforeseen threat actors on the battlefield.


Future Warfare: the Rise of Hybrid Wars / J.N. Mattis and F. Hoffman

This is an important distinction as the Pentagon completes the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Relevance is more important than yesterday’s dominance. The reasons that some claim dominance in their particular area of expertise or their domain of warfare is that no one is contesting us in that domain. If you want to start arguing about strategic priorities in the QDR, we argue that you look at where our enemies are gathering to fight us. That is relevance.


Hybrid Actors, Tactical Variety: Rethinking Asymmetric and Hybrid War / J. Schroefl & S.J. Kaufman

Wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan should be understood as hybrid wars, wars in which elements of ethnic or tribal conflict, ideologically based insurgency, factional squabbling, and organized crime are inextricably intertwined, with the same actors playing multiple and partially conflicting roles. Hybrid war is inherently transnational, featuring transnational crime networks, “migrant warriors,” transnational diaspora links, legitimate international trade, and foreign intervention. It takes place in hybridized states reliant on local warlords and other actors whose power prevents effective state-building. In this context, while counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes appropriate military strategy and tactics, the core problem is more political than military. Since a hybridized client state is not likely to be politically reformable even if a foreign ally achieves military success, outside allies like the United States should generally refrain from boots-on-the-ground intervention, pursuing instead a diplomatic solution, even though such a deal is likely to be unpalatable.

Hybrid vs. Compound War, The Janus choice: Defining today’s Multifaceted Conflict / F. Hoffman
Armed Forces Journal, 2009 (1 oktober)
Over the past two years, the hybrid threat construct has found some traction. It appears in official
government reports and has been cited by the defense secretary in articles and speeches. In
addition, it was referred to in the new Joint Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, in Joint Forces
Command’s Joint Operational Environment 2008 and in the latest Maritime Strategy.
However, it is not clear this usage is based on a common understanding of what a hybrid threat or
hybrid warfare entails. Hence, this article details an array of definitions and debates their merits and
an alternative concept - compound war. It also provides a preliminary overview of ongoing historical
study related to this issue.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/

Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques / A. Deep
Small Wars Journal, 2015 (2 maart)
While the means by which state and non-state actors conduct hybrid war today have changed, the
fundamental principle of utilizing a combination of conventional and irregular methods to achieve a
political objective is consistent with older forms of conflict. This blending has historic examples in
the American Revolution with George Washington’s Continental Army and robust militia forces; the
Napoleonic Wars where British regulars challenged French control of major Spanish cities, while
Spanish guerrillas attacked their lines of communication; and the Arab Revolt where the British Army
combined conventional operations in Palestine with irregular forces under British operational
control.[i] However, despite having its roots in history, modern hybrid war has the potential to
transform the strategic calculations of potential belligerents due to the rise of non-state actors,
information technology, and the proliferation of advanced weapons systems.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques

Hybrid Warfare
Defence Journal Vol. 18 (2015), no. 7, p. 82-83
Called "Hybrid Warfare" Wikipedia Encyclopaedia says this new military strategy envisages attacks by
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare.
Carrying out extensive nuclear tests (Operation Shakti) at Pokhran in the Rajasthan Desert in 1998,
the BJP Govt went to town advising Pakistan that it was in our own interest to recognize the nuclear
writing on the wall and accept India's hegemony in South Asia.

Hybrid Warfare, Lawfare, Informational War. the Wars of the Future / I. Chifu
Bucharest, Romania: “Carol I” National Defence University.
The 21st century came with challenges to the very nature of the international relations and with
huge threats to the security. And it came with new forms of conflict presented to us by entities and
states using new types of wars. The fourth generation war (4GW) is the general approach to the new
types of conflicts characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and
civilians. Carl von Clausewitz spoke about the war as a continuation of the politics with different
means, 4GW makes a concrete passage to this reality, with the fusion between the two principles,
politics and war. The present article represents overview, a first charted analysis on the evolution of
21st century conflicts, and our original contribution to the debate of the modern warfare, the
evolution of those concepts and, especially, the way that those concepts are applied in practice, on
the ground, in real combat.
http://search.proquest.com.nlda.idm.oclc.org/docview/1693216484/abstract?
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges / F.G. Hoffman
Joint Forces Quarterly Vol. 52 (2009), p. 34-39
The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge.

Hybrid Wars / G. Grant
Government executive, 2008 (1 mei)
What if the battles of the future are neither conventional nor irregular, but a combination of both?
http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2008/05/hybrid-wars/26799/

Hybrid wars / John J. McCuen
Military theorists have started to call those conflicts "hybrid wars" or "hybrid warfare" (to include the Army Chief of Staff when he recently announced publication of the new Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Full Spectrum Operations) but few, unfortunately, have talked substantively about how to fight such wars and achieve enduring success. [...] hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously-and more decisively-attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations).
http://search.proquest.com.nlda.idm.oclc.org/docview/225305596/5F87DF38CEE64335PQ/15?accountid=35226

Hybrid Wars : The 21st Century's New Threats to Global Peace and Security / S. Bachmann
This article discusses a new form of war, 'hybrid war', with inclusion of aspects of 'cyber-terrorism' and 'cyber-war' against the backdrop of Russia’s ‘Ukrainian Spring’ and the continuing threat posed by radical Islamist groups in Africa and the Middle East. It also discusses the findings of an on-going hybrid threat project by the Swedish Defence College. This interdisciplinary article predicts that military doctrines, traditional approaches to war and peace and their perceptions will have to change in the future.
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/view/117421

Is hybrid warfare something new? / Craisor-Constantin, I.
The Sep 11, 2001 event and the beginning of the 21st Century came up with new concepts regarding the future of warfare, describing the rise of non-state willing and its possibility to be able to change the legitimacy of the state. New theories, like "new wars", "compound wars", "unrestricted warfare", "robotic warfare", "political warfare", have been launched trying to capitalize the changes that occurred in the international security arena and in the diminishing of the international organization’s power to manage those situations. The Second Lebanon War of 2006 was the trigger that matched the views of many military analysts who have suggested that future conflicts will be multi-modal or multi-variant, by combining of increasing frequency and lethality. The new construct, known as the "hybrid warfare", was exacerbated by the current crisis situation in Ukraine and the Russian intervention in Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine.
http://search.proquest.com.nlda.idm.oclc.org/docview/1692921983/70FE91E340AF484EPQ/1?accountid=35226
What does Hybrid Warfare mean to Europe? Four experts weigh in.

European Leadership Network, 2014 (21 oktober)

The Ukraine Crisis has sparked a new debate in Europe as the nature and effectiveness of Russia’s use of ‘Hybrid Warfare’. The European Leadership Network has asked three leading defence and foreign policy experts from the Baltics to offer their perspectives on this new and developing threat.


BLOGS

On Not So New New Warfare : Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats / F. Hoffman

Frank Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. He retired from the Marine Corps Reserve in the summer of 2001 at the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. He directed the NDU Press, which includes the journals Joint Force Quarterly and PRISM. From August of 2009 to June 2011, he served in the Department of the Navy as a senior executive as the Senior Director, Naval Capabilities and Readiness. Frank is a Ph.D. Candidate the King’s College London War Studies Department.

War on the Rocks , 2014 (28 juli)

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine challenges our traditional Western concepts of warfare. The current crisis, pitting the national government against separatists, Russian ultra-nationalists, proxy fighters and possibly Russian GRU personnel, does not fit neat Western categories of “war.” In one sense it’s a civil war, or perhaps a proxy war that pits Ukraine against Russia. Current doctrine tries to separate conflict into two boxes, irregular and conventional. General Barno, in this journal, recently referred to this crisis as an example of a shadow war, worthy of greater study. He correctly notes that war is morphing beyond our current conceptions. The evolving character of contemporary conflict has presented an intellectual challenge that has perplexed security analysts and forward thinking scholars for some time.


The Problem with Hybrid Warfare / N. Schadlow

Dr. Nadia Schadlow is a senior program officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation, where she identifies strategic issues that warrant further attention from the U.S. policy community and manages and develops programs and projects related to these issues. She served on the Defense Policy Board from September 2006 to June 2009 and is a full member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Schadlow holds a B.A. degree in government and Soviet studies from Cornell University and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the John Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

War on the Rocks , 2015 (2 april)

Europe is now a petri dish for hybrid war. Events of the past decade, not to mention the last few years, have reaffirmed the value of a concept that sought to explain a range of diverse, coercive instruments across the operational spectrum of war. Hybrid warfare is a term that sought to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categories of conflict. It uses a blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has referred to these hybrid threats as an “inflection point” in modern war. Indeed, in the disordered post-Cold War world, hybrid warfare remains an excellent framework for understanding the changing character of war.

Was sind "Hybride Kriege"? Und worin unterscheiden sie sich von den "Neuen Kriegen"?


Von Clausewitz, on war / C.P.G. von Clausewitz
London : Routledge, 2004
Aanvraagnummer KMA 82 A25 C0 [C48-C50]
On War is perhaps the greatest book ever written about war. Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian soldier, had witnessed at first hand the immense destructive power of the French Revolutionary armies which swept across Europe between 1792 and 1815. His response was to write a comprehensive text covering every aspect of warfare. On War is both a philosophical and practical work in which Clausewitz defines the essential nature of war, debates the qualities of the great commander, assesses the relative strengths of defensive and offensive warfare, and - in highly controversial passages - considers the relationship between war and politics. His arguments are illustrated with vivid examples drawn from the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. For the student of society as well as the military historian, On War remains a compelling and indispensable source.

Hybrid Warfare : fighting complex opponents from the ancient world to the present / W. Murray, P.R. Mansoor (eds.)
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012
Aanvraagnummer KMA 81 G95 H19
Hybrid warfare has been an integral part of the historical landscape since the ancient world, but only recently have analysts incorrectly categorized these conflicts as unique. Great powers throughout history have confronted opponents who used a combination of regular and irregular forces to negate the advantage of the great powers' superior conventional military strength. As this study shows, hybrid wars are labor-intensive and long-term affairs; they are difficult struggles that defy the domestic logic of opinion polls and election cycles. Hybrid wars are also the most likely conflicts of the twenty-first century, as competitors use hybrid forces to wear down America's military capabilities in extended campaigns of exhaustion. Nine historical examples of hybrid warfare, from ancient Rome to the modern world, provide readers with context by clarifying the various aspects of conflicts and examining how great powers have dealt with them in the past.
Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response.

There are a variety of terms used to refer to the hybrid war concept: hybrid war, hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, or hybrid adversary. US military bodies tend to speak in terms of a hybrid threat, while academic literature speaks of a hybrid warfare. For the purposes of this article, these terms are used interchangeably.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_warfare

Hybrid Warfare : LibGuide
Brussels : NATO Multimedia Library
Libguide intended to provide a few starting points to assist you with your research on issues related to hybrid warfare, in particular in the NATO context.
http://natolibguides.info/hybridwarfare

Irregular Warfare : a selected Bibliography
Carlisle Barracks : U.S. Army War College
The study of Irregular Warfare is a special theme in the curriculum of the U.S. Army War College. This selected bibliography reflects books, documents, periodical articles, and websites relating to this topic.

Irregular Warfare annotated bibliography / P.J.Tompkins Jr.
Fort Bragg : U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2011 (2 juni)

Unconventional Warfare (UW) : Libguide
MacDill ASir Force Base, Florida : Joint Special Operations University Library
http://jsou.libguides.com/unconventionalwarfare
RAPPORTEN

Afschrikking tegen niet-traditionele dreigingen /F.P van der Putten, M. Meijnders, & J. Rood
Den Haag : Clingendael, 2015 (30 juni)
In deze deelstudie staat de vraag centraal hoe afschrikking een relevant en effectief veiligheidsconcept en –instrument kan zijn ter bescherming van de nationale veiligheidsbelangen. Deze belangen worden, zoals reeds in het overzichtsrapport van de van de Clingendael Monitor werd aangegeven, in toenemende mate bedreigd door een diffuus palet aan traditionele en niet-traditionele dreigingen.
Er wordt specifiek gekeken naar een vijftal niet-traditionele dreigingen: terrorisme, georganiseerde criminaliteit, dreigingen via het cyber- en economische domein en ambigue oorlogsvoering.
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/afschrikking

Analyzing Hybrid Warfare / R.M. Cromwell
Carlisle Barracks : The United States Naval War College, 2010
NLDA Elektronisch document (via catalogus Defensiebibliotheken)

Back to the Future? Russia’s hybrid warfare, revolutions in military affairs, and Cold War comparisons / D. A. Ruiz Palmer
Rome : NATO Defence College
Research Division : Research Paper no. 120, 2015 (oktober)

The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare / E. Hunter & P. Pernik
Tallinn : ICDS (International Centre for Defence and Security), 2015 (11 april)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked a rethinking of traditional geopolitical norms and warfare tactics. For this reason, ICDS convened a panel of experts to shed light on recent developments and in particular, Russian use of hybrid warfare. This report is largely drawn from discussions with those experts.

A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War” / M. Rojansky & M. Kofman
Washington D.C. : Wilson Center, Kennan Institute,
Kennan Cable No.7, 2015 (14 april)
Western observers have fallen into a now familiar parlance for describing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine. Frequently termed Russia’s “hybrid war” against Ukraine, it is seen by the West as a threatening precedent—even a likely model—for future conflicts on Russia’s periphery. In this view, a Russian campaign against the Baltic States, Kazakhstan or even Poland might employ a variety of tools, ranging from conventional to irregular combat operations, sponsorship of political protests, economic coercion, and a powerful information campaign.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no7-closer-look-russias-hybrid-war

Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars / F. Hoffman
Arlington : The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007 (december)
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time. Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a “Revolution in Warfare.” Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that
successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one’s goals at that particular time—identified as “Hybrid Wars” in Conflict in the 21st Century. Hoffman notes that it is too simplistic to merely classify conflict as “Big and Conventional” versus “Small or Irregular.” Today’s enemies, and tomorrow’s, will employ combinations of warfare types. Non-state actors may mostly employ irregular forms of warfare, but will clearly support, encourage, and participate in conventional conflict if it serves their ends. Similarly, nation-states may well engage in irregular conflict in addition to conventional types of warfare to achieve their goals. The monograph lays out some of the implications of the concept. Clearly the United States must be prepared for the full spectrum of conflict from all fronts and realize that preparing our forces for only selected types of conflict will be a recipe for defeat.


Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Paper
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2014 (26 september)
During the last decade, the U.S. military, along with its interagency and international partners, has generated significant capability to counter the irregular threats presented by non-state terrorists, insurgents, and criminal groups. During these same years, a distinct challenge to America and its partners in NATO and beyond has arisen through an innovative mix of such irregular threats. This challenge is Hybrid Warfare combining conventional, irregular, and asymmetric means, to include the persistent manipulation of political and ideological conflict. Foreshadowed by Iranian actions throughout the Middle East and by Chinese “unrestricted warfare” strategists in the 1990s, Hybrid Warfare has now reached its most brazen form in Russia’s support for separatist insurgents in Ukraine.

https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-counter-unconventional-warfare/

FM 3-0: Operations / Full spectrum operations.
Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008 (februari)
Doctrinal publication presenting overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting operations. The seven updated chapters that make up this edition of Operations constitute the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. FM 3-0 also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Education System curricula.

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf

Hybrid War: A New Paradigm For Stability Operations In Failing States / M.S. Bond
Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2007 (30 maart)
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 identified stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) as core missions for future US military operations. This policy envisions military operations in a variety of complex pre- and post-conflict environments. It commands military planners to expand their arsenal of resources for achieving this mission to include elements of economic, social, and political, as well as military, power. Thus, future strategic military plans will necessarily assume a kind of hybrid nature, embracing a spectrum of elements of national power. Historically, projection of the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power and development of the programs that sustain them has been the jurisdiction of the interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs). However, where a hostile environment precludes deployment of civilians to implement such, the DoD becomes the only viable agency likely to succeed in the task. This paper develops a strategic concept for use by the US military in its future stability and security missions in pre-conflict environments. Further, this concept is adaptable for use in a variety of unstable environments. Finally, this strategic concept is designed to coordinate and
transition to more traditional civilian programs as soon as the security environment permits.

**Hybrid Warfare: A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs? / T. Bjerregaard**  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012  
In the last decade, a new term, hybrid war, has been surfacing amongst scholars of warfare. The latest Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine also uses the term. Proponents of hybrid warfare use the term to describe the area where regular warfare and irregular warfare intersect and blend to create a new form of warfare. This thesis uses the Williamson Murray and McGregor Knox definitions of Military Revolution (MR) and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in order to determine if hybrid warfare falls under MR or RMA. As necessary, insights from other sources have further helped define Murray and Knox’s concept of MR and RMA.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to settle an argument about the validity of the concept off hybrid warfare. Neither does it propose to verify whether there are grounds for using the term hybrid warfare or not in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine. The thesis simply tries to analyze a concept brought forward in recent theoretical military discourse. Based on the above, this thesis will not suggest any doctrinal changes or concepts of training for hybrid warfare. It will not suggest any changes to the current force structure within the Swedish Armed Forces. Only the term hybrid warfare will be examined, not the term hybrid threats.  

**Instabiliteit ron rond Europa: confrontatie met een nieuwe werkelijkheid.**  
Den Haag : Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV)  
Advies 94, 2015 (30 april)  
In dit advies stonden de volgende vragen centraal:  
Hoe moeten de ontwikkelingen aan de grenzen van Europa worden beoordeeld? Is er inderdaad sprake van een ‘gordel van instabiliteit’ en zal Europa hiermee voor langere periode te maken hebben?  
Op welke manieren dienen de NAVO en EU te reageren op de uitdagingen aan de flanken van Europa? Welke opties dienen zich hierbij aan en wat is de impact van de Amerikaanse ‘draai’ richting Zuidoost-Azië?  
Welke Nederlandse belangen zijn in het geding en in hoeverre wordt de Nederlandse veiligheids situatie bedreigd door de ontwikkelingen aan de oost- en zuidflank van Europa? Hoe kunnen deze belangen het beste worden behartigd c.q. beschermd? Wat zijn de implicaties voor het Nederlandse buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid en de defensie-inspanningen van Nederland?  
http://aiv-advies.nl/?pn/publicaties/adviezen/instabiliteit-rond-europa-confrontatie-met-een-nieuwe-werkelijkheid

**NATO and New Ways of Warfare: Defeating Hybrid Threats / J. Lindley-French**  
(NDC Conference, Rome 29-30 april 2015)  
NDC Conference Report -Research division- Nato Defense College, 2015 no. 3  
Summary of the discussions and policy recommendations made during the Conference, as recorded by the author, to further broaden our knowledge of twenty-first century NATO’s strategic environment and defence requirements, “enabling peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe”.  
New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses / M. Drent, R. Hendriks, D. Zandee
Den Haag : Clingendael, 2015 (13 juli)
This report assesses the consequences of the changing security environment for the EU and NATO. It starts (chapter 2) with an overview of the wide variety of risks and challenges that Europe is facing, with a focus on the eastern and southern neighbourhood. Chapter 3 is dedicated to NATO. What capacities should be available to the Atlantic Alliance in the new security environment? This involves issues like the Alliance’s future strategic military posture, both nuclear and conventional. How should the force posture be rebalanced, in particular how should more robust land forces be combined with the requirement of high-speed mobility and deployability? What can NATO do to deal with hybrid threats and by what means should the Alliance prepare itself for hybrid conflict? In chapter 4 the same question about the impact on capacities is answered for the European Union. The EU has all of the tools in house, from CSDP operations to sanctions, trade and energy policies. Yet, applying them in an integrated way – which is highly desirable in response to hybrid threats – remains a huge challenge. Is the EU’s comprehensive approach in need of adaptation to a new security environment which is different from the past crisis management context? What does it mean for CSDP, for example to deal with the situation in the South at the EU’s borders?
As both the EU and NATO are adapting in response to new security challenges, the issue of their relationship is also back on the agenda. Berlin Plus is outdated. The new world requires a more strategic relationship instead of a set of military-technical arrangements between the EU and NATO. This might also have consequences for the capacities that the two organisations should be able to deploy. What should be the priorities for each of them? How can the capacities of the EU and NATO be synchronised in order to realise a more systematic, coherent and efficient response by Europe and North America to the changing world? These issues are addressed in chapter 5. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations in chapter 6.

VIDEO
Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Threats, and the Future Role of Ground Forces : Keynote
Washington D.C. : Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009 (1 juni)
Video about ~